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Abstract
We show an auction-based algorithm to compute market equilibrium prices in a production model,
where consumers purchase items under separable nonlinear utility concave functions which satisfy
W.G.S(Weak Gross Substitutes); producers produce items with multiple linear production constraints.
Our algorithm differs from previous approaches in that the prices are allowed to both increase and
decrease to handle changes in the production. This provides a taˆtonnement style algorithm which
converges and provides a PTAS. The algorithm can also be extended to arbitrary convex production
regions and the Arrow-Debreu model. The convergence is dependent on the behavior of the marginal
utility of the concave function.
1 Introduction
The market equilibrium is a well studied problem for a general market model which includes production
constraints[2]. Arrow and Debreu[1] had introduced a general production model for exchange markets and
have shown proof of existence of equilibria. In the Arrow-Debreu model, each production schedule lies in a
specified convex set. When the production model is constrained by positive production vectors only, convex
programs have been obtained[28][26] for linear cases. There has been considerable recent research on the
complexity of computing equilibria [4, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 21].
To solve the market equilibrium problem, a number of approaches have been used including convex
programming, auction-based algorithm[17] and primal-dual[10] methods.
Two techniques, the primal-dual schema and auction-based algorithms, have mainly been successful for
models satisfying W.G.S.(weak gross substitutability). Other technique includes taˆtonnement processes.
Jain et al.[23] further generalize to a model with homothetic, quasi-concave utilities which is introduced in
[14] and [15]. However, the paper is restricted in that the concave functions are assumed to be homogeneous
of degree one. We differ in that we consider functions that are Weak Gross Substitutes. Jain et al.[22] also
give an explicit, polynomial sized convex program for the production planning model with linear utilities.
These papers utilize convex programming. Codenotti et al. [9] consider gross-substitute functions with
positive production constraints and provide approximation results via the ellipsoid method. Recent results
that include production within the model include the work on price discrimination model [20]. Our results
apply to convex production sets that are not constrained to be positive.
For the production model when there is one constraint an auction-based algorithm is provided in [25]. In
this paper, we give an auction-based algorithm for a production model in which consumers have separable
utilities for items that satisfy the weak gross substitutes property. Furthermore, producers have multiple
linear production constraints. Note that we can also consider producers that sell items to maximize their
profit as well as purchae materials or resources to produce them. In this model, note that each buyer
chooses a subset of items that maximizes her utility and each producer chooses a feasible production plan
that maximizes his profit at current prices.
While auction methods have been applied to market equilibrium problems, the key aspect of many
algorithms ([19][25]) is that price discovery is monotone since goods are always sold out, i.e. overdemanded.
In this model, the change in production plans during the course of the algorithm induces oversupply of
goods. This implies that price discovery cannot be monotone. This is a critical difference from previous
methods. Thus unlike previous auction-based algorithms for consumer and production models, we consider
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auction algorithm which decrease price also. Since each producer has an arbitrary number of production
constraints, updating prices affects production schedule. When producers chooses a bundle of items which
also maximize consumer utilities, decreasing the prices is not required. However, when profitable items are
not demanded by consumers, price decrease may be needed. Bounding the decrease in price can be done
by small increments of the production plan along a gradient direction specifying increasing profits. The
direction is obtained from the convex program describing the production plans. The step length is dictated
by the behavior of the utility functions, in particular on the behavior of the marginal utility function. For
simplicity of presentation our results are shown in the Fisher model with linear production constraints.
They can be extended to arbitrary convex production regions and the Arrow-Debreu model.
This paper is organized as follow: In Section 2, we define the production market model and invariance
of the algorithm to show the correctness and the convergence. We describe the overall idea on the auction-
based algorithm and describe in market states and market state transitions in Section 3. Further, procedures
are described in Section 4 and we show invariance conditions that ensure optimality in Section 5. In Section
6, we finally show the correctness of the algorithm in the algorithm and evaluate the complexity. In the
Appendix, we will describe the details of the algorithm.
2 Production Model
We consider a market equilibrium problem with production, termed asMEP, with nonlinear utility functions
and multiple linear production constraints. In here, we consider nonlinear utility functions satisfy W.G.S.
property. The production model we consider has q producers, along with n consumers(traders) andm items.
For simplicity, we assume that every item is produced in a quantity greater than or equal to ǫ.
Consumer i has a utility function, termed as Ui(Xi) =
∑
j uij(xij), and fixed initial endowment, ei. xij
represents the amount of allocation on item j to consumer i, Xi = (xi1, xi2, ..., xim) denotes the current
allocation vector on the items to consumer i, and uij(xij) : R
+ → R+ is the function representing the utility
of item j to consumer i. Our assumption is that uij is separable. We denote by vij the first derivative of Ui
w.r.t. xij .
We let P be the vector of prices of the items, where the j-th component pj represents the price of item
j. Then, we can represent bang-per-buck, ∀i, j : αij = vij(xij)/pj, and let αi be max bang-per-buck s.t.
αi = maxj αij .
For producers, let zsj represent the quantity on item j produced by producer s and sold or bought by
producer s. Also, there are non-manufactured raw items defined as aj for all items. Producer s gains profit∑
j pjzsj when all items are sold out at the price P . We assume that the production schedule is constrained
by a set of linear inequalities. Suppose producer s has ls linear constraints. Then, ∀s, ℓ :
∑
j zsja
ℓ
sj ≤ K
ℓ
s,
where aℓsj and K
ℓ
s are constants determined by the production schedules by producer s. ∀s, j : zsj ∈ Z.
Given a fixed vector of prices P , the following linear programs, CPi(P ) and PPs(P ) represent the optimal
consumption and production schedule, respectively.
Consumer nonlinear programming for consumer i
CPi(P ): Maximize
m∑
j=1
Ui(Xi) subject to
∑m
j=1 xijpj ≤ ei ∀i (1)
xij ≥ 0 ∀i, j (2)
Production linear programming for producer s
PPs(P ): Maximize
m∑
j=1
pjzsj subject to
∑
j zsja
ℓ
sj ≤ K
ℓ
s ∀s, ℓ (3)
zsj ≥ 0 ∀s, j (4)
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Furthermore, we assume that utilities for the items satisfy the Weak Gross Substitute property. Items
are said to be weak gross substitutes for a buyer iff increasing the price of any item does not decrease the
buyer’s demand for other items. Similarly, items in an economy are said to be weak gross substitutes iff
increasing the price of any item does not decrease the total demand of other items.
Consider the consumer maximization problem CPi(P ). Let Si(P ) ⊂ R
m
+ be the set of optimal solutions
of the program CPi(P ). Consider another price vector P
′ > P . Items are gross substitutes for buyer i if
and only if for all Xi ∈ Si(P ) there exists X
′
i ∈ Si(P
′) such that pj = p
′
j ⇒ xij ≤ x
′
ij .
Note that since uij is concave, vij is a non-increasing function. The following result in [17] characterizes
the class of separable concave gross substitutes utility functions.
Lemma 2.1 [17] Items are gross substitutes for buyer i if and only if for all j, yvij(y) is a non-decreasing
function of the scalar y.
ǫ-equilibrium in the Production Model We define an ǫ-equilibrium in the production model as follows:
1. Sold-out condition: All produced items are sold to consumers within a factor of (1 + ǫ).
2. Bpb condition: The bang per buck on the items purchased by consumer i should be almost the same.
3. Opt-prod condition: The current production plan almost maximizes the profit of each producer.
4. Termination condition: Consumers spend all their endowment within a factor of (1 + ǫ).
The first three condition are referred to as conditions OPT and are detailed below:
I1 : ∀j :
∑
s
zsj/(1 + ǫ) ≤
∑
i
xij ≤
∑
s
zsj (5)
I2 : ∀i, j : xij > 0⇒ vij(xij) ≤ αijpj ≤ (1 + ǫ)vij(xij) (6)
I3 : ∀s, j : pj zˆsj ≤ (1 + ǫ)pjzsj (7)
where zˆsj is the optimal amount of item j produced by s. Equilibrium is established together with the
termination condition below:
I4 : ∀i : ri ≤ ǫei (8)
3 Auction Algorithm for the Production model
3.1 Notations and Preliminaries
We define the demand set of consumer i as Di = {j : vij(xij)/((1 + ǫ)pj) ≤ αi ≤ vij(xij)/pj}. We work
with a discretized price space, and at any instant a good is sold at at two level prices: pj and pj/(1 + ǫ).
We let hij represent the amount of item j that consumer i buys at price pj , and yij represent the amount of
item j that consumer i purchases at price pj/(1 + ǫ). xij which is the summation of hij and yij represents
the total quantity of allocation on item j by consumer i. We also let ri denote residual money which can
be calculated as ei −
∑
j(pjhij + pjyij/(1 + ǫ)).
We denote by Zs a set of feasible production plan(schedule) of producer s i.e., Zs = {Z : A
TZ ≤ Ks},
where A represents a m× ℓ matrix whose row and column correspond to items and constraints, respectively.
Z represents a production plan and Ks represents capacity constraints, Z,Ks ∈ R
m. Note that Z is an
unconstrained vector, that is, if a producer produces item j as a product, then Z may be positive; if a
producer consumes item j as a material or resource, then Z may be negative. Let us define a profitable
production plan of producer s as Zˆs = argmaxZ∈Zs{P
TZ|ATZ ≤ Ks} at price P .
We define a set of over-demanded items Od = {j : ∃i s.t.
∑
s zsj <
∑
i xij}. Moreover, we define a set
of over-supplied items as Os = {j :
∑
s zsj >
∑
i xij}.
3
3.2 Algorithm Overview
We apply the auction mechanism to solve the problem of finding equilibrium in the linear production model.
Note that in this application we allow the algorithm to decrease and increase prices. The market equilibrium
in the production model is to find a price vector at which consumers maximize their utility and producers
maximize their profit. Consumers want to purchase items at lower price, while producers want to sell items
at higher price, creating complementary optimization constraints. In fact, the producers would wish to
produce as much demand as the market can sustain, to maximize their profit. The algorithm we design
allows producers to increase supply incrementally to change their production plan according to the current
market price.
The algorithm is iterative and its progress can be measured by the changes in its state during successive
steps. The algorithm we design allows producers to increase supply incrementally to change their production
plan according to the current market price. To prove convergence we will show that the producer’s profit
increases during phases of the algorithm.
Overview of the algorithm The algorithm starts with an initialization , procedure initialize where
the price vector is initialized, each producer is assigned an initial production schedule and each consumer
is assigned goods, all quantities small enough. In procedure algorithm main, the algorithm determines if
consumers have no extra demand and producers have no way to increase their profit and consequently stops.
The invariant conditions to be maintained at the end of every phase are conditions (5),(6) and (7). If at the
beginning of a phase no consumer has any residual money left, the procedure can terminate satisfying all the
conditions. Otherwise, it is determined if the consumer can outbid other consumers to acquire her desired
items in procedure satisfy demand and subsequently adjust the allocations of other consumers adjust bpb
to ensure condition (6). Each of these procedures may result in an increase in price. Consequently, the
production schedule may required to be changed. This is done in procedure prod reschedule.
Algorithm 3.1 algorithm main
1: initialize
2: // bpb, opt-prod and sold-out conditions hold.
3: while there exists consumer i with residual money do
4: update bang-per-buck
5: // bpb, opt-prod and sold-out conditions hold.
6: satisfy demand(i)
7: // sold-out condition holds.
8: adjust bpb
9: // bpb and sold-out conditions hold.
10: prod reschedule
11: // bpb, opt-prod and sold-out conditions hold.
12: end while
13: // termination, bpb, opt-prod and sold-out conditions hold.
Algorithm 3.2 satisfy demand(i)
consumer i with extra demand purchase items
1: update a set of demanded items of consumer i
2: if item j is available at lower price from consumer k then
3: outbid(i, k, j, αij)
4: update bang-per-buck
5: else
6: raise price(j)
7: end if
The procedure, prod reschedule, determines a feasible direction that improves the profit of a producer,
by using a linear program.A small step of length δ is taken along the feasible direction. The step length is
chosen so that optimality conditions hold as shown later. The step provides a new production plan based
on the current price vector P , and the production of items may decrease and increase as compared with
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Algorithm 3.3 adjust bpb
bang-per-buck condition holds by outbid
1: while bang-per-buck not hold, i.e ∃i : ri > 0 and ∃j : αijpj < vij(xij) do
2: if item j is available at lower price from consumer k then
3: outbid(i, k, j, αij)
4: else
5: raise price(j)
6: end if
7: end while
the previous production plan. Also, note that zsj may be negative in that producer s consumes item j to
produce other items; The change in the production of items leads to goods that are either oversupplied or
over demanded. The demand and supply are then balanced in the procedures: bal od and bal os.
Due to a change in the production plans, a good j may be reduced in quantity. Then the consumers
holding the good h have reduced allocation and have money m, returned to them. To ensure their bang-per-
buck conditions, consumers outbid other consumers in procedure bal od. After procedure bal od, procedure
adjust bpb is called to ensure that bang-per-buck conditions are met. Note that this may involve a rise in
price.
A change in production may also involve increased production of some particular good. In procedure
bal os, the algorithm will balance over-supplied items so that there is no over-supplied item in the market.
Procedure bal os balances the demand and supply of over-supplied items by four different procedures
: purchase money, transfer money, sell lprice and decrease price. Procedure purchase money is allowed
for consumer with extra demand to acquire items. Unless consumer has residual money, procedure trans-
fer money will take money from other items to purchase her demand items. If the market has an item that
is over-supplied, then producers will provide items at a lower price as shown in procedure sell lprice. Finally,
Procedure decrease price will be called if there is no available item at a higher price.
Algorithm 3.4 prod reschedule
1: while execute lp solver and if not at optimality, ∀s, j : z′sj := zsj ± ǫ
′
∑
s zsj/q do
2: if producer can increase profit then
3: bal od(j) : ∀j ∈ Od
4: adjust bpb
5: // bpb condition holds.
6: bal os : ∀j ∈ Os
7: // bpb and sold-out conditions hold.
8: check profit
9: else
10: break
11: end if
12: end while
13: // bpb, sold-out and opt-prod condition hold.
Finally, the algorithm checks whether there is total profit increase in the overall process at each iteration.
Procedure check profit will be called to check whether consumers spend more than they did at the prior
iteration.
If the total profit does not increase, then changes of productions plans are voided. It is shown later that
in this case the production plans are at near optimality. The algorithms then exits prod reschedule.
Choosing a value of ǫ′ We will assume that the producers will change their production plan by a factor
of 1 + ǫ′. We choose ǫ′ to ensure an approximation of (1 + ǫ.
We choose constants as follows: set ǫ1 s.t. ∀i, j : vij(xij)/(1 + ǫ) ≤ vij((1 + ǫ1)xij) ≤ vij(xij) and
∀i, j : vij(xij) ≤ vij((1 − ǫ1)xij) ≤ (1 + ǫ)vij(xij). Let ǫ2 = ǫ
3/e, e =
∑
i ei and let ǫ
′ = min(ǫ1, ǫ2).
5
3.3 States of the market
The state of the market at time instant t is represented as a 3-tuple (P (t), Z(t), X(t)), where P (t), Z(t)
and X(t) represent the price vector, the production plan and the current allocation (or demand) at time t,
respectively. We will also use pj(t), zsj(t) and xij(t) to denote the price of item j, the production plan for
item j by producer s and the demand of consumer i for item j at time t, respectively.
We consider the transitions of the state of the market at time t, (P (t), Z(t), X(t)), to the states at time
t+ 1, (P (t+ 1), Z(t+ 1), X(t+ 1)) via an algorithmic process.
State Transitions of the market We consider the state transitions :
P (t+ 1) = fP (P (t), Z(t), X(t)) (9)
X(t+ 1) = fX(P (t), Z(t), X(t)) (10)
Z(t+ 1) = fZ(P (t), Z(t), X(t)) (11)
where we design the functions fP , fX and fZ to satisfy conditions (5) through (8)on the state of the market.
The state transition function fP , fX and fZ are computed in algorithm main. At each iteration conditions
(5) through (7) should be satisfied. Furthermore we will show that at termination, condition (8) is true and
thus at termination the market is in a state of equilibrium.
The function fP depends on a parameter P (t), Z(t) and X(t). In other words, pj(t) will increase by
a factor of (1 + ǫ) unless ∃i : yij(t) > 0. The procedure outbid may occur on either consumer’s side or
producer’s side. Consumer i outbids consumer k to acquire item j, or producer s outbids consumer k to
consume item j to produce item j′.
To compute fX we invoke procedure satisfy demand which allows consumer i with ri > ǫei to purchase
item j ∈ Di at pj(t) by acquiring item j from consumer k. If the demand and the supply does not match,
then procedures outbid, bal os or bal od may be called so that X(t+ 1) may change.
To update the production schedule and compute fZ , we invoke procedure prod reschedule. According
to P (t), a linear program solver returns an optimal production schedule. As mentioned before, a next
production schedule is determined by the demand and the supply.
3.4 Market State Transitions
States of market in procedure satisfy demand We now detail the change of the states of market
as well as maintenance of invariants in procedure satisfy demand inside procedure algorithm main. In
a market state, (P (t), Z(t), X(t)), procedure satisfy demand calls either outbid or raise price when ∀j :
αijpj = vij(xij). Since there exists consumer i s.t. ri > ǫei, she will buy item k = argmaxj αij .
Note that before procedure satisfy demand, ∀j : αij = vij(xij(t))/pj(t). Then, for item j 6= k, αijpj(t) =
vij(xij(t)) and αijpj(t+1) = vij(xij(t+1)). In the case of item k, αikpk(t) = vik(xik(t)) and αikpk(t+1) =
(1 + ǫ)vik(xik(t+ 1)). However, αik will be updated, and finally, ∀j : αijpj(t+ 1) = vij(xij(t+ 1)).
Since there is, P (t) and X(t) may be not equal P (t+1) and X(t+1), respectively. However, no change
in production plan, Z(t) = Z(t+ 1).
States of market in procedure adjust bpb We next consider changes to the states of the mar-
ket and the invariants in procedure adjust bpb inside procedure algorithm main. In a market state,
(P (t), Z(t), X(t)), procedure adjust bpb calls either outbid or raise price when ∃j : αijpj < vij(xij). For
the corresponding consumer i, ∀j : αijpj = vij(xij) at the end of adjust bpb.
For item j s.t. αijpj(t) < vij(xij(t)), procedure outbid makes pj(t) = pj(t + 1), xij(t) < xij(t + 1);
on the other hand, procedure raise price makes (1 + ǫ)pj(t) = pj(t + 1). The aim of this procedure is
αijpj(t+ 1) = vij(xij(t+ 1)).
Therefore, P (t) and X(t) may be not equal to P (t + 1) and X(t + 1), respectively. Since there is no
change in production plan, Z(t) = Z(t+ 1).
States of market in procedure prod reschedule Given (P (t), Z(t), X(t)) (the current market state)
procedure prod reschedule calls lp solver which returns optimal production plans, Zˆs according to P (t) (as
shown in line 2 in procedure prod reschedule). Zs(t+ 1) depends on Zs(t) and Zˆs as follows:
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∀s, j : zsj(t+ 1) =
{
zsj(t) + ∆, ∆ = ǫ
′
∑
s zsj(t)/q if ‖∆‖ ≤ ||zˆsj(t)− zsj(t)||
zˆsj(t) otherwise
Since the production plan changes, allocations of consumers and production of producers might change.
These changes may increase or decrease price of items. We describe more details in Section 4.
4 Other procedures in the algorithm
In this section we will discuss other important and their properties.
1. outbid(i, j, k, α) : consumer i with surplus will outbid consumer k to acquire item j. The quantity that
is outbid of item j is determined by the utility function and the current allocation so as to maintain
the invariance. After we set the amount outbidden, we need to update the allocation and the surplus
of both consumers i and k.
2. purchase money(i, j, toversupply) : for item j ∈ Os, the procedure will check whether item j is demanded
by consumer i with surplus. If exists, consumer i will purchase item j as much as the minimum of the
quantity oversupplied and extra demand. Here we also need to update the allocation of consumer i
on item j and the surplus.
3. transfer money(i, j, toversupply): in the case when there is no consumer with surplus for item j ∈ Os,
the procedure transfer money will be called. That is, consumer i with demand on item j will give up
item j′ and spend the returning money to buy item j. The allocation of consumer i will be updated
for item j and j′.
4. sell lprice(i, j, toversupply) : if there is consumer neither with surplus nor with items transferable,
producers will offer item j at lower price. Remember that the algorithm accepts two-level price: a
higher price and a lower price by a factor of (1 + ǫ). Producers are forced to supply item j at a lower
price, then either j is fulfilled or no consumer has item j at a higher price.
5. decrease price(j) : when procedure sell lprice fails to fulfill item j, we assure that the allocation of
item j is at a lower price to any consumer. Then, procedure decrease price will be called, and the
while statement of procedure bal os will check whether procedures purchase moeny, transfer money
or sell lprice might be called.
6. raise price(j) : after the procedure prod reschedule, if there is a consumer with surplus then consumer
i outbids other consumers. If consumer i is not satisfied then she will increase the price of item j by a
factor of (1+ ǫ). Procedure raise price itself does not change the allocation, but affects invariance that
should be maintained in the algorithm. As consumers acquire item j at higher price than previous,
the producers may change their production plan. This will be checked in the program.
5 Invariances
In this section we will prove the invariances that hold during the course of the algorithm. We first discuss
the properties of two procedures.
5.1 Procedure raise price
We consider the number of occurrences of procedure raise price.
Lemma 5.1 In procedure prod reschedule at most one occurrence of procedure raise price is required.
Proof: We claim that procedure raise price occurs at most once per each item at each iteration in procedure
prod reschedule.
Definitely, procedure bal os will not call procedure raise price. Procedure prod outbid allows producers
to outbid consumers , but procedure raise price will not be called.
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Procedure bal od will be called , and consumer i may potentially violate condition (6) because vij(xij)
increases when xij decreases. To adjust bang-per-buck condition, procedure adjust bpb will be called.
If ∀k : ykj = 0 and αijpj < vij(xij), then procedure raise price will be called once. Note that αijpj =
vij(xij) ≤ vij(x
′
ij) ≤ (1 + ǫ)αijpj , where x
′
ij corresponds to the reduced amount of item j of consumer i.
Since ǫ′ is chosen to satisfy vij(xij) ≤ vij((1− ǫ
′)xij) ≤ (1+ ǫ)vij(xij), αijpj ≤ vij(x
′
ij) ≤ (1+ ǫ)αijpj . After
raise price, i.e. p′j = (1 + ǫ)pj, αijp
′
j ≥ vij(x
′
ij).
Therefore, at most one occurrence of procedure raise price will be enough in procedure prod reschedule. ⊓⊔
5.2 Procedure decrease price
Similarly, we consider the number of occurrences of procedure decrease price.
Lemma 5.2 Procedure decrease price of each item occurs at most once per each iteration in procedure
prod reschedule.
Proof: Let p and p′ denote a previous price vector and a current price vector, respectively. Let z and z′
denote a previous production plan and a current production plan, respectively.
Suppose, for contradiction, that procedure decrease price on item j occurs at least twice in an iteration.
Remember that we have two additional variables ǫ1 and ǫ2 and ǫ
′ = min(ǫ1, ǫ2) in a paragraph in Section 3.
It is enough to show the case when ǫ′ = ǫ2 = ǫ
3/
∑
i ei.
The money required to consume the oversupplied items is
ǫ′
∑
s
∑
j′
zsj′pj′ = ǫ
3
∑
s
∑
j′
zsj′pj′/
∑
i
ei
Calling decrease price on item j returns the following amount of money to all consumers,
((ǫ2 + 2ǫ)
∑
i
hij + ǫ
∑
i
yij)pj
For decrease price to occur more than once, the required money must be greater than the money returned,
i.e.
ǫ3
∑
s
∑
j′ zsj′pj′∑
i ei
> ((ǫ2 + 2ǫ)
∑
i
hij + ǫ
∑
i
yij)pj
Since
∑
s
∑
j′ zsj′pj′ ≤
∑
i ei,
ǫ3 > ((ǫ2 + 2ǫ)
∑
i
hij + ǫ
∑
i
yij)pj
⇒ ǫ2 > ((ǫ + 2)
∑
i
hij +
∑
i
yij)pj >
∑
i
xijpj
⇒ ǫ2 >
∑
i
xijpj ≥ ǫ
2
Since every item is demanded by at least one consumer, the money spent on item j ,
∑
i xijpj should be
equal or at least ǫ2, i.e.
∑
i xijpj ≥ ǫ
2. This is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Ensuring sold-out condition (5): Procedures adjust bpb and satisfy demand will not violate the in-
variance because there is no change in production plan and the amount of items sold does not decrease.
When producer s changes a production plan from Zs(t) to Zs(t+ 1), the following cases arise.
•
∑
s zsj(t+ 1)−
∑
i xij(t+ 1) > 0
•
∑
s zsj(t+ 1)−
∑
i xij(t+ 1) < 0
Procedure bal od resolves the first case, and the second case can be resolved in procedure bal os. That is,
procedure bal od balances all items in Od; procedure bal os balances oversupplied items.
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1. For j ∈ Od, if ∃i : xij > 0 then xij(t+ 1) = xij(t)−min(xij(t), ξ) shown in procedure bal od.
2. For j ∈ Os, if ∃i : j ∈ Di and ri > ǫei, then consumer i will purchase item j by using procedure
purchase money (as shown in line 2 and 3 in procedure bal os). It ensures that pj(t) = pj(t+ 1) and
while
∑
s zsj(t+1) =
∑
i xij(t+1), OPT(conditions sold-out(5) through bang-per-buck(6)) conditions
are met.
3. Otherwise, i.e. ∃i s.t. j ∈ Di
⋂
Os and ri ≤ ǫei
(a) To ensure that item j is sold out, the item is sold to consumer i s.t. j ∈ Di. This can only happen if
consumer i transfers money from a item that provides lower bang-per-buck, i.e consumer i spends
money to purchase item j instead of item k s.t. xik > 0
∧
αik < αi(in procedure transfer money).
The procedure transfer money ensures that sold-out(5) condition is satisfied.
(b) If item j is still over-supplied, then producers may offer item j at a lower-level price (remember
there are 2 price levels). Note that the current price pj does not change, but consumers will acquire
item j more with the same amount of money. When
∑
s zsj(t+1)−
∑
i xij(t+1) ≤ ǫ
∑
i hij(t+1),
item j will be sold out with the same money(in procedure sell lprice). Then, pj(t) = pj(t + 1)
and
∑
i xij(t) <
∑
i xij(t+ 1). Conditions OPT will be satisfied.
(c) Item j will not be sold out yet if
∑
s zsj(t + 1) −
∑
i xij(t + 1) > ǫ
∑
i hij(t + 1). Then, in-
stead of providing item j at lower-level price, producers will offer item j at a lower price than
before i.e. pj(t + 1) = pj(t)/(1 + ǫ)(in procedure decrease price). Then, pj(t) > pj(t + 1)
and
∑
i xij(t) <
∑
i xij(t + 1). If still
∑
s zsj(t + 1) >
∑
i xij(t + 1), then conditions OPT
may not be satisfied. However, then the iterations within the procedure bal os will repeat until∑
s zsj(t+ 1) =
∑
i xij(t+ 1).
Lemma 5.3 Condition (5) is satisfied at the end of procedure prod reschedule.
Ensuring bpb condition (6):
Lemma 5.4 Condition (6) is satisfied after procedures satisfy demand and adjust bpb.
Proof: In initialization, vij(xij) ≤ αijpj is true. When procedure adjust bpb occurs in procedure algo-
rithm main, vij(xij) ≤ αijpj is always true since adjust bpb iterates until ∀j : vij(xij) = αijpj . Also,
αijpj ≤ (1 + ǫ)vij(xij) is true.
In procedure satisfy demand, note that αij is updated according to vij(xij) and pj which implies
that ∀j : vij(xij) = αijpj . For k = argmaxj αij , consumer i purchases x
′
ik amount of item k s.t.
vik(x
′
ik) = αikpk/(1 + ǫ). Then, vij(xij) ≤ αijpj is still true. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5.5 Condition (6) is satisfied at the end of procedure bal od.
Proof: We claim that condition (6) holds at the end of bal od based on Lemma 5.1.
Let us consider procedure bal od where consumers balance their over-demand items. Let consumer i
give up some amount on item j. Consumer i may potentially violate condition (6) because vij(xij) increases
when xij decreases.
However, as shown in Lemma 5.1, raise price occurs at most once at each iteration. Therefore, any price
or allocation change does not violate condition (6). ⊓⊔
Lemma 5.6 Condition bpb (6) is satisfied at the end of procedure bal os.
Proof: Let producer s change his production plan, and j ∈ Os. There are two possible situations in
procedure bal os: 1)procedure decrease price is not called. 2)procedure decrease price is executed.
Procedure decrease price is not called since consumers consume all amount of item j. Let consumer i
have surplus, i.e. ri > ǫei, and j ∈ Di. Since consumer i has surplus, she will buy item j as shown in
procedure purchase money. However, it will not violate condition (6) because consumers will only purchase
item j within a factor of (1 + ǫ) of bang-per-buck. That is, previously αijpj = vij(xij), and x
′
ij increases
such that vij(xij) ≤ vij(x
′
ij) ≤ (1 + ǫ)vij(xij).
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Although consumer i has surplus, the algorithm is allowed for consumers to purchase items by calling
procedures transfer money and sell lprice. Since the amount of production change is well defined, both
procedures do not violate bpb condition. Recall that procedure transfer money allows consumer i to buy
item j to balance bang-per-buck.
When all other procedures do not resolve the over-demand of item j, procedure decrease price occurs.
The occurrence of procedure decrease price implies that consumers who want to buy item j do not have
enough money. After procedure decrease price occurs, let consumer i buy item j, and let x′ij correspond to
the new amount of item j of consumer i.
Previously αijpj = vij(xij) and after one occurrence of procedure decrease price as shown in Lemma
5.2,
(1 + ǫ)αij = vij(xij)/p
′
j
Consumer i now outbids to take item j. Then,
vij(xij)/(1 + ǫ)p
′
j ≤ vij(x
′
ij)/p
′
j ≤ vij(xij)/p
′
j
(1 + ǫ)αij/(1 + ǫ) ≤ vij(x
′
ij)/p
′
j ≤ (1 + ǫ)αij
αij ≤ vij(x
′
ij)/p
′
j ≤ (1 + ǫ)αij
⊓⊔
Ensuring opt-prod condition (7): It happens that no producer reschedule their production plan. When
there is no profit for producers, producers do not want to change their own production schedule. Even in
the case, we show that producers will satisfy the following inequality as follow:
∀s, j : pjzsj ≤ pjz
∗
sj ≤ (1 + ǫ)
2pjzsj
Lemma 5.7 When the procedure roll back occurs, producer s still has O(1+ǫ)-approximation optimal profit
according to the current prices.
Proof: Let V (z, p) denote the current profit of producer s on production plan z according to the price
vector p. Similarly, let V (z′, p) be the next profit of producer s on production plan z′ according to the price
vector p. V (z¯, p) denotes the profit of producer s when he has the production plan z¯, the optimal production
plan according to the price vector p.
When the production plan shifts from V (z, p) to V (z′, p), price may change to p′ due to procedure
decrease price. The occurrence of procedure decrease price may violate that producer s increases his profit.
In procedure prod reschedule, if producer s has no profit increase, then there is no production change. We
will show that when procedure roll back, producer s still guarantees his production profit is well bounded
compared with the optimal production profit. We show this by proving that
V (z¯, p) ≤ (1 + 2ǫ)V (z, p)
Note that z, z′, z¯ are points on the poly-tope of multiple linear production constraints. By the property,
z¯ = z + (z′ − z)/σ⇒ z¯p′ = zp′ + p′(z′ − z)/σ
where σ = |z′ − z|/|z¯ − z|.
V (z¯, p′) = V (z, p′) + (V (z′, p′)− V (z, p′))/σ
Let V (z′, p′) = (1 + ǫ′)V (z, p′),
V (z¯, p′) = V (z, p′) + ǫ′V (z, p′)/σ
Let ǫ′/σ ≤ ǫ,
V (z¯, p′) ≤ (1 + ǫ)V (z, p)
Note that the procedure decrease price occurs at most once in procedure prod reschedule which implies that
∀j : pj ≤ (1 + ǫ)p
′
j .
V (z¯, p) ≤ (1 + ǫ)V (z¯, p′) ≤ (1 + 2ǫ)V (z, p)
⊓⊔
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6 Analysis of the algorithm
6.1 Invariances
Lemma 6.1 When the algorithm terminates conditions OPT are satisfied and the algorithm returns a
O(1 + ǫ)-approximate optimum.
Proof: Condition sold-out (5) is true at the end of each iteration of the algorithm as shown in Lemma 5.3,
condition (5) holds at the end of prod reschedule.
Condition bang-per-buck (6) is satisfied at the end of algorithm as shown in Lemma 5.4, bpb condition
holds after calling procedures adjust bpb and satisfy demand. In the case of procedure prod reschedule, as
shown in Lemma 5.4, Lemma 5.5 and Lemma 5.6, condition (6) holds.
Condition (7) is true at the end of prod reschedule as shown 5.7. ⊓⊔
6.2 Convergence
Now, let us consider time complexity which guarantees that our algorithm converges in We show the con-
vergence of each procedure before we provide time complexity.
Remember that bidding is organized in rounds. In each round every consumer is picked once and reduces
his surplus until ri = 0. If there is no outbid, then procedure raise price will occur followed by procedure
prod reschedule. In procedure prod reschedule, the algorithm will balance between the demand and the
production.
Let N0 = log1+ǫ
e
ǫemin
, N1 = log1+ǫ
pmax
pmin
= log1+ǫ
e
ǫ
and N2 = log1+ǫ′
e
ǫ3emin
, where pmax = maxj pj
and pmin = minj pj.
Claim 6.1 After N1 ∗N2 rounds of bidding, either the algorithm terminates or a round robin completes.
Proof: If any producer does not reschedule, then price rises. In the worst case, the maximum number of
calls to raise price is bounded by log1+ǫ
pmax
pmin
, termed N1.
If producers gain profit, then at least one producer will increase her profit by a factor of (1 + ǫ′) of the
previous profit. We can bound the number of occurrence as log1+ǫ′
e
ǫ3emin
, termed N2.
After N1 ∗N2 rounds, procedure algorithm main will be executed. If there is no consumer with residual
money, then the algorithm will exit. Otherwise, the next round robin will occur. ⊓⊔
Let Tob, Tls, Tbd, and Tbs denote the time taken for procedures outbid, lp solver, bal od and bal os,
respectively. Tls = O(qm
2(m+ l)L) and Tbd + Tbs = mTob + nm where Tob = log1+ǫ
(e
ǫ
)|E| evmax
ǫvmin
(vmax =
maxij xij(0) and vmin = minij xij(amax)). Let |E| be the number of nonzero utilities. Also, note that
ǫ′ = min{ǫ3/e,max
ij
vij(0)/(1 + ǫ) = v((1 + ǫ
′)ǫ).
Lemma 6.2 The time complexity of finding equilibrium in MEP is O(N0 ∗N1 ∗N2(Tls + Tbd + Tbs)).
Proof: Let us consider the worst case. For one round-robin, either procedure outbid or raise price occurs.
The number of iterations before a round robin occurs is bounded by N1 ∗N2 as shown in Claim 6.1. Note
that between round-robins, residual money decreases by a factor of (1 + ǫ′) of total money of consumers. It
means that total occurrence of round-robins is bounded by N0 = log1+ǫ′
e
ǫemin
. Therefore, the total step is
bounded by N0 ∗N1 ∗N2.
Inside procedure prod reschedule, four events can occur in a call of outbid.
1. ykj becomes zero for some k.
2. ri becomes zero.
3. αij reduces by a factor of (1 + ǫ).
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4. vij reaches αij in the inner while loop of algorithm main.
The number of event (1) is bounded by the number of buyers having non-zero utilities on item j. The
total number of (1) events is bounded by |E| × N1. The number of type (2) events is exactly equal to n
in every round of bidding. At every type (3) event, bang-per-buck is reduced by a factor of (1 + ǫ) which
varies from
vmin
pmax
to
vmax
pmin
. In every round only one event type of (4) occurs for each buyer.
Thus, outbid takes |E| log1+ǫ
pmax
pmin
+ log1+ǫ
pmaxvmax
pminvmin
= log1+ǫ
(e
ǫ
)|E| evmax
ǫvmin
as shown in [19].
Note that lp solver is called per each iterations. The function, lp solver, takes O(qm2(m+ l)L), where
m× l represents a matrix of production constraints and L represents an input size. Tlp solver = O(qm
2(m+
l)L). It takes mTob times for consumers to get money back and for the procedure decrease procedure, and
it takes nm times for producers to sell their produced items. Tbd + Tbs = mTob + nm.
Time complexity is O(N0 ∗N1 ∗N2(Tls + Tbd + Tbs)). ⊓⊔
Theorem 6.1 Approximation equilibrium in the market equilibrium with production, MEP, can be deter-
mined by a PTAS.
Proof: At termination, termination condition (8) is true because ri is low. Other conditions are true by
Lemma 6.1 which ensures the correctness. The time complexity result follows from Lemma 6.2. ⊓⊔
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we show an auction-based algorithm for a production model where consumers have nonlinear
utility functions and producers have a set of linear capacity constraints. Our algorithm can also be extended
to arbitrary convex production regions and the Arrow-Debreu model.
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A Appendix - Algorithm
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Algorithm A.1 algorithm main
1: initialize
2: while there is extra demand, i.e. ∃i : ri > ǫei do
3: satisfy demand(i)
4: adjust bpb
5: prod reschedule
6: end while
Algorithm A.2 initialize
1: ∀j : pj := ǫ
2: ∀i : αi := maxj vij(0)/pj
3: ∀i : Di := argmaxj vij(0)/pj
4: ∀s, j : zsj := ǫ/q
5: ∀i : xij := ǫ, where j ∈ Di
6: ǫ1 s.t. ∀i, j : minxij vij(xij)/(1 + ǫ) = vij((1 + ǫ1)xij)
7: ǫ2 := ǫ
3/n, n =
∑
i ei
8: ǫ′ := min(ǫ1, ǫ2)
Algorithm A.3 satisfy demand(i)
1: ∀j : αij := vij(xij)/pj
2: j := argmaxl αil
3: if ∃k : ykj > 0 then
4: outbid(i, k, j, αij/(1 + ǫ))
5: αij := vij(xij)/pj
6: else
7: raise price(j)
8: end if
Algorithm A.4 adjust bpb
1: while ∃i : ri > 0 and ∃j : αijpj < vij(xij) do
2: if ∃k : ykj > 0 then
3: outbid(i, k, j, αij)
4: else
5: raise price(j)
6: end if
7: end while
Algorithm A.5 outbid(i, j, k, α)
1: t1 := ykj
2: t2 := ri/pj
3: if (vij(aj) ≥ αpj) then
4: t3 := aj
5: else
6: t3 := min δ : vij(xij + δ) = αpj
7: end if
8: t := min(t1, t2, t3)
9: hij := hij + t
10: ri := ri − tpj
11: ykj := ykj − t
12: rk := rk + tpj/(1 + ǫ)
14
Algorithm A.6 raise price(j)
1: pj := pj(1 + ǫ)
2: ∀i : yij := hij
3: ∀i : hij := 0
Algorithm A.7 prod reschedule
1: while true do
2: get the optimal production plan, i.e. ∀s : zˆsj := lp solver(p)
3: ∀s, j : z′sj := zsj ± ǫ
′
∑
s zsj/q
4: if
∑
s
∑
j pjz
′
sj >
∑
s
∑
j pjzsj then
5: bal od : ∀j ∈ Od
6: adjust bpb
7: bal os
8: check profit
9: else
10: break
11: end if
12: end while
Algorithm A.8 bal od
1: while ∃j ∈ O+d do
2: if ∃i : xij > 0 then
3: t := min(xij ,
∑
i xij −
∑
s zsj)
4: xij := xij − t
5: ri := ri + tpj
6: end if
7: end while
Algorithm A.9 bal os
1: while ∀j ∈ Os do
2: if ∃i : j ∈ Di and ri > ǫei then
3: purchase money(i, j,
∑
s zsj −
∑
i xij)
4: else
5: if ∃i : j ∈ Di and ri ≤ ǫei then
6: transfer money(i, j,
∑
s zsj −
∑
i xij)
7: end if
8: if producers provide items at lower price, i.e.
∑
s zsj −
∑
i xij ≤ ǫ
′
∑
i hij then
9: sell lprice(i, j,
∑
s zsj −
∑
i xij)
10: else if Not enough items at lower price, i.e.
∑
s zsj −
∑
i xij > ǫ
′
∑
i hij then
11: decrease price(j)
12: end if
13: end if
14: end while
Algorithm A.10 purchase money(i, j, to)
1: t := min(to, ri/pj)
2: to := to − t
3: hij := hij + t
4: ri := ri − tpj
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Algorithm A.11 transfer money(i, j, to)
1: if to > 0 and hij′ > 0 then
2: t := min(hij′p
′
j/pj, to)
3: hij′ := hij′ − tpj/p
′
j
4: hij := hij + t
5: to := to − t
6: end if
Algorithm A.12 sell lprice(i, j, to)
1: while to > 0 do
2: if to ≥ ǫ
′hij then
3: yij := yij + (1 + ǫ
′)hij
4: to := to − ǫ
′hij
5: hij := 0
6: else
7: yij := yij + to
8: hij := hij − to/(1 + ǫ
′)
9: to := 0
10: end if
11: end while
Algorithm A.13 decrease price(j)
1: ∀i : hij := (1 + ǫ)hij + yij
2: ∀i : yij := 0
3: pj = pj/(1 + ǫ)
4: ∀i : αi := maxj′ vij′/pj′
5: ∀i : Di := argmaxj′ vij′/pj′
Algorithm A.14 check profit
let z′ and p′ be vectors of the previous iteration.
1: if
∑
s
∑
j zsjpj −
∑
j z
′
sjp
′
j < γ = ǫ
′mins
∑
j pjzsj then
2: roll back
3: break
4: end if
16
